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Abstract
Competition among physicians is widespread, but compelling empirical evidence on its
impact on service provision is limited, mainly due to endogeneity issues. In this paper
we exploit that many GPs, in addition to own practice, work in local emergency centres,
where the matching of patients to GPs is random. The same GP is observed both with
competition (own practice) and without (emergency centre). Using high-dimensional fixed-
effect models, we find that GPs with a fee-for-service (fixed-salary) contract are 12 (8)
percentage points more likely to certify sick leave at own practice than at the emergency
centre. Thus, competition has a positive impact on GPs’sicklisting that is strongly reinforced
by financial incentives.
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1 Introduction
Competition among physicians is widespread. Almost every country has a market-based alloca-
tion of physician services, though the scope for competition may vary according to government
regulations. In particular, the extent to which prices of physician services are set administra-
tively or determined in the market differs across public and private health care systems. In this
paper we study the effect of non-price competition among physicians on their service provision in
a National Health Service (NHS), and how this relationship depends on the financial incentives
provided by the physicians’remuneration schemes.
Despite the widespread presence of competition in physician markets, the empirical evidence
on its impact on physicians’service provision is surprisingly scarce.1 There are only a few papers,
which we discuss below, that provide compelling evidence on the causal relationship between
competition and physician behaviour. A main reason for this is that market structure is endoge-
nous, which makes it hard to obtain plausible exogenous variation in the degree of competition.
A standard regression analysis of market concentration on physicians’service provision, as used
by most of the existing literature on physician markets, will yield biased estimates. While in-
strumental variable approaches could be employed to deal with the endogeneity problem, the
lack of data in physician markets has made this diffi cult.2
In this paper we propose a novel approach to identify the impact of competition on physicians’
service provision. More precisely, we take advantage of the fact that many General Practitioners
(GPs), in addition to their regular offi ce practice, work in local primary care emergency centres
(PCECs). At the PCECs, the physician-patient matching is random, implying that the GPs face
exogenous demand and thus no competition for patients. However, at the GPs’own practice,
the matching is a result of patient choice and the GPs should realise that their treatment
decisions will affect both the probability that the patient chooses to remain on the GPs’list in
the future, and also, through reputation effects, the probability that new patients will choose to
be listed with the GP. Since the data allows us to observe the same GP in different competitive
environments, being exposed (in own practice) or not (in emergency centre) to competition, we
are in principle able to isolate the effect on competition on GP behaviour in a way that allows
1See the review by Gaynor and Town (2011).
2For more details, see Gaynor and Town (2011).
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us to make causal inferences.
A key advantage of our approach is that it allows us to control for selection issues related
to GPs’choice of location and type of remuneration. GPs’choice of location may potentially
depend on the degree of competition in the local market. If particular GPs tend to a larger extent
to locate in more competitive geographical areas, then estimations that base identification on
cross-sectional variation in the degree of competition in local markets will yield biased results.
In a similar way, the allocation of GPs across remuneration schemes is obviously not random,
but an endogenous choice made by the GP. Given that there is selection of GPs into different
reimbursement schemes, using cross-sectional variation across GPs’remuneration yields biased
results. By focusing on the same GP in two different environments, our approach accounts for
these kinds of selection issues, enabling us to identify causal effects of competition on GPs’
behaviour, here measured according to their propensity to certify sickness absence for their
patients.
An important issue, though, is to control for other factors (than competition) that may
influence physician behaviour in the two competitive environments. To do so, we exploit rich
administrative data with detailed patient-level information in Norway from 2006 to 2014. From
these data, which basically cover the whole population in Norway, we select the ten most frequent
acute diagnoses treated by GPs. As outcome variable, we use certification of (paid) sick leave,
which is a highly frequent and standardised ‘treatment choice’made by GPs for acute diagnoses.
The detailed data allow us to estimate high-dimensional fixed-effect models using only within
patient and GP variation. This implies that we control for all time-invariant unobserved (and
observed) patient and GP heterogeneity. We also include diagnosis fixed-effects and control for
time trend, as well as a wide set of potentially time-varying patient and GP characteristics.
Our key finding is that GPs are more likely to issue sick leave to patients that visit them
at their own practice than at the emergency centre. We also find that, when exposed to com-
petition, GPs with an activity-based (fee-for-service and capitation) contract are much more
likely to offer sick leave than GPs with a fixed-salary contract. These results are economically
significant. In our most preferred model, GPs with an activity-based contract are 12 percent-
age points more likely to offer a sick leave at their own practice than at the emergency centre,
whereas the equivalent figure for GPs on fixed-salary contracts is 8 percentage points. These
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findings are (in qualitative terms) highly robust across a large set of specifications and sensitivity
tests. We therefore conclude that competition does influence physician behaviour, and that this
effect is strongly reinforced by financial incentives (i.e., activity-based remuneration of physician
services).
To develop economic intuition for the results, we construct a dynamic model of GPs’choices
of sick-listing practice styles when patients differ in illness severity and thus the need for a sick
leave. In the model patients always (weakly) prefer a sick leave certificate irrespective of illness
severity, as it is optional to make use of it. This implies that, under competition, GPs can
increase future demand by adopting a more lenient sick-listing practice style. Assuming GPs are
semi-altruistic and that deviating from medical sick-listing guidelines (i.e., being too lenient) is
costly for the GP, we show that the effect of exposing GPs to competition crucially depends on
the GPs’remuneration scheme. For GPs with an activity-based (fee-for-service or capitation)
contract, competition always induces the GPs to be more lenient in terms of sick listing. For GPs
with a fixed-salary contract, the effect of competition is a priori ambiguous. If GPs are mainly
profit motivated, competition induces the GPs to adopt a stricter practice style in order to avoid
(rather than attract) patients. However, the reverse is true if GPs are suffi ciently altruistic and
thus put a larger weight on patients’benefit from obtaining a sick leave relative to the costs of
being too lenient.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the relevant
literature. In Section 3 we present the Norwegian primary care market. In Section 4 we develop
a dynamic model for GPs’sick listing practice and derive predictions for the empirical analysis.
In Section 5 we present our data and provide some descriptive statistics. In Section 6 we explain
our empirical strategy and in Section 7 we present our empirical results. In Section 8 we present
several robustness checks and extensions in order to validate our results and empirical strategy.
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
The economic literature on the market for physician services is extensive. A majority of work
is on ‘physician agency’that focuses on the role of asymmetric information in the relationship
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between patients and physicians and physician-induced demand.3 There is also a large and
related literature on physician incentives and payment schemes that studies the effects of fee
changes on physicians’supply of medical services.4 However, the literature on competition per
se in physician markets is surprisingly sparse despite its widespread presence.5
There exists an early literature on the effects of competition on pricing of physician services.
Most of this literature tends to use the number of physicians per capita within a geographic area
as measure of competition, and exploit across-area variation to estimate the effect of competition
on service prices.6 More recent papers use instead measures of market concentration, such
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), to estimate the impact on service prices.7 A key
problem is that these measures of competition are endogenous and thus yield biased results. A
recent paper by Dunn and Shapiro (2014) deal with this problem by using predicted (rather
than actual) fixed-travel-time HHI, as used by Kessler and McClellan (2000) for competition in
hospital markets. Linking these concentration measures to health insurance claims in the US,
they find that physicians in more concentrated markets charge higher service prices. Another
paper is Gravelle et al. (2016) who study the impact of competition on consultation prices
charged by GPs in Australia. The degree of competition is measured by distance between GPs,
and they use within area (rather than across area) variation to identify the effects of competition
on GPs’consultation prices. They argue that the areas are suffi ciently small to account for the
fact that GPs’ locational decisions are endogenous. They find that GPs with more distant
competitors charge higher prices and a smaller proportion of their patients make no out-of-
pocket payment. Our paper differs from this strand of literature in that we focus on the impact
on non-price competition variables (i.e., sick listing) and take a different approach to obtain
exogenous variation in the degree of competition (i.e., within GP variation in competition and
service provision).
The number of studies on the impact of competition on physicians’service provision is much
3See, for instance, the review by McGuire (2000) and the recent paper by Jacobson et al. (2013).
4See, for instance, the seminal work by Gruber and Owings (1996) and the more recent work by Devlin and
Sarma (2008), Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) and Brekke et al. (2017).
5For a review, see Gaynor and Town (2011).
6See, for instance, the seminal work by Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) who use data on 92 US metropolitan
areas. They find that areas with more physicians per capita have lower prices.
7See, for instance, Schneider et al. (2008) who find that physician market concentration in California, measured
by HHI, is associated with higher prices.
5
more limited than the above-mentioned literature on physician pricing. A recent paper by Santos
et al. (2017) provide evidence from the UK that patients respond to quality differences among
GPs and are willing to travel further to higher quality practices. While this is not a direct test
of the effects of competition, the study shows that GPs face higher demand if they improve
their quality. There are a few papers that use ‘shortage of patients’as competition measure,
where shortage of patients is defined by whether the GP has open vacancies on their patient
lists. The idea is simply that patients with closed list are competing less than those with open
lists. For instance, Iversen and Lurås (2000) and Iversen (2004) show that Norwegian GPs who
experience shortage of patients provide more services and thus obtain higher income per patient
than their colleagues with full patient lists. A similar approach is taken by Iversen and Ma
(2011) who find that more intense competition, measured either by whether the GPs’patient
list is open or by the GPs’desired list size, leads to more diagnostic radiology referrals. Finally,
Godager et al. (2015a) find that increased competition, measured either by the number of open
primary physician practices or HHI, has negligible or small positive effects on referrals overall.
Although it might seem plausible that GPs compete less aggressively in local markets with few
open lists, the competition measure is clearly endogenous and thus likely to suffer from the same
endogeneity problem as the use of market concentration measures, such as the HHI. Our paper
differs from this strand of literature in that we do not consider the relationship between primary
and secondary care and the gatekeeping role of GPs.8 More importantly, we propose a different
approach to identifying the effect of competition on GPs’ service provision, using within GP
variation rather than across GP or local market variation.
Finally, we should mention a closely related study by Markussen and Røed (2017). They
study, as we do, the GPs’propensity to issue sickness certificates to patients using Norwegian
administrative data. Their study consists of three separate parts. First, they identify each GPs’
degree of ‘gatekeeper leniency’ at each point in time by using worker (patient) fixed effects,
which is identified by worker movements between GPs and between sick leave and work. Second,
they examine the extent to which workers choose GPs that are more lenient by estimating a
conditional logit model, where the choice set is identified by the observed GP choices among
8Besides the above-mentioned studies, there are several papers that adress the role of GPs as gatekeepers for
specialist care; see, for instance, Dusheiko et al. (2006), Brekke et al. (2007), and Gonzalez (2010).
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other workers in the same local area. Third, they examine whether GPs adjust their gatekeeper
leniency in response to fluctuations in demand or in costs of losing patients. This is done using a
fixed effect model where the effects are identified on the basis of changes in the local competitive
environment or in the GP’s remuneration structure. Their results show that patients tend to
choose GPs that have a more lenient sick-listing practice and GPs tend to become more lenient
in local markets with stronger competition. While this study reports similar results as we do,
they use conventional measures of (local) competition, such as the number or share of GPs with
open lists (vacancies), the number of GPs per capita in an area, or the share of patients with a
recent GP switch. A well-known problem with these measures is that they are market outcomes
possibly affected by the GPs’service provision, including in our case their sick listing practice.
Our contribution is to propose a different approach to identify the causal impact of com-
petition by examining the same (within) GP’s sick listing practice in two different competitive
environments, i.e., with competition (own practice) and without competition (emergency centre).
As GPs are obliged to also work at emergency centres, this gives plausible exogenous variation
in the exposure to competition, which allows us to make causal inference about the impact of
competition on GPs’sick listing. Using GPs on fixed-wage contracts as baseline, Markussen and
Røed estimate that competition (along with fee-for-service) increases sick listing by around 4
percent. This finding is also consistent with our results, where we show that fee-for-service GPs
respond more strongly to competition than fixed-salary GPs. An advantage of our approach is
that we can disentangle the impact of competition from remuneration, while the two effects are
non-separable in their study. Finally, our analysis on the impact of competition on GPs’sick
listing accounts for (unobserved) patient heterogeneity by including patient fixed effects, which
is not done by Markussen and Røed, though they explicitly model patient heterogeneity in their
analysis of patients’choice of GP.
3 Institutional background
In the Norwegian National Health Service (NHS), primary care provision is the responsibility
of the municipalities, although funding and regulation are to a large extent made by the central
government. Since the implementation of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme (Fastlegere-
7
formen in Norwegian) in 2001, each inhabitant of Norway has the right to be listed with a GP.9
Patients are free to choose their GP (if the GP has vacant patient slots), and can switch GP
(without stating any particular reason) at most twice per year.10 The rate of patient-induced
changes of regular GP is relatively small but far from negligible. According to numbers ob-
tained from the Norwegian Directorate of Health, 6.4 percent of the patients initiated a change
of regular GP in each of the years 2009 and 2013.11
In contrast, the GPs are not allowed to select their patients. GPs are free to choose their
preferred patient list size in the interval between 500 and 2500 patients, but must accept any
patient who wishes to be listed with the GP as long as there are available slots on the GP’s
list. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the variation in preferred and actual list size during our
period of analysis, which is 2007 to 2014. Although the variation is larger across GPs, as one
would probably expect, there is also considerable variation for each GP over time, particularly
with respect to actual list size. This variation is obviously partly driven by patients who change
their regular GP.
All GPs need to have a contract with a municipality to set up a practice and serve patients
within the NHS, irrespective of remuneration scheme. This contract regulates opening hours,
list size, and offi ce location. The vast majority (around 95 percent) of GPs are self-employed
and run their own private practice, receiving a mix of capitation and fee-for-service, where the
latter amounts to around 70 percent of their income.12 The capitation part is covered by the
municipality, whereas the fee-for-service part is covered by the public social security agency and
(to some degree) patient co-payments.13 The remaining (5 percent) of the GPs are employed by
the municipality and receive a fixed salary.14 The (level of) GP remuneration is determined in
9 In the following, ‘GP’refers to primary care doctors that are contracted or employed by the municipalities,
i.e., GPs within the NHS.
10When choosing a GP, patients are not restricted to GPs located in their own municipalities. In practice,
though, the share of patients listed with GPs outside their own municipalities is very low.
11 In absolute numbers, these changes involved 311,000 patients in 2009 and 325,000 patients in 2013.
12Some municipalities also offer contracts where the municipality provides premises, equipment and/or staff for
the private practice. In return, the municipality keeps the capitation fee while the GP receives the fee-for-service
income.
13There are in principle significant co-payments associtated with primary care services, but an annual cap of
approx. €200 for individual health expenditures followed by 100 percent coverage from social insurance, implies
in practice a very low share of de facto patient co-payments.
14The work week for GPs with a fixed salary contract is 37.5 hours. In addition, the GPs, irrespective of
remuneration scheme, are obliged, according to their contract with the municipality, to spend a given number of
hours at the PCEC. The municipality may also require the GPs to spend some hours at nursing homes, health
clinics, prisons, etc. This is also independent of remuneration scheme.
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annual negotiations between the medical association and the associations representing central
and local governments.
Municipalities are also responsible for the emergency primary health care for their inhabitants
(and visitors). These services are offered either at a GP’s offi ce or at PCECs, which often
serve several municipalities. During evenings, nights and weekends, all emergency contacts are
directed to these centres. In larger municipalities, PCECs also offer services during daytime.
During ordinary opening hours, all GPs are obliged to accept and assess patients in need of
emergency care in their own practice. In principle, if they are below the age of 60, GPs are also
obliged to provide emergency care at PCECs, though it is possible to apply for exemption based
on health or social reasons. In practice, more than 50 percent of the GPs work at PCECs.
Approximately half of the consultations taking place at PCECs are with a regular GP and
the rest are covered by locums and junior doctors from hospitals. When working in an emergency
centre during daytime or in the evenings, the vast majority of GPs are paid according to the same
fee-for-service schedule as the one used for contracted GPs in their regular practice (Godager et
al., 2015b). The PCECs are mainly visited by patients with infections, musculoskeletal problems,
injuries and other physical disorder, though approximately 5 percent is related to mental health
problems. Epidemiological research has found that, compared to many other countries, primary
care emergency services are frequently used in Norway, and often in relation to conditions that
could just as well have been treated by the patient’s regular GP. The reason for this pattern
appears to be relatively poor access to the GP during daytime (Sandvik et al., 2012). A key
feature of the consultations taking place at the emergency centres is that patients are randomly
matched with doctors, which we exploit as an identification strategy in our empirical analysis.
The implications of this will be further discussed in Section 6, where we describe our empirical
strategy.
An important function that GPs are entrusted with is gatekeeping to the Norwegian sickness
benefit system, in which workers are entitled to a 100 percent replacement rate up to a maximum
threshold (approximately €61,000 or $64,700) from the first day of sick leave and until one year
for the same sickness spell. The first 16 days of sick leave are paid by the employer, while sickness
benefit beyond the first 16 days is covered by the public social security agency.15 Self-certification
15The change of payer after 16 days might affect incentives for sickness absence, in the sense that it might be
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can be used for the first three or eight days of an absence spell depending on employer.16 Beyond
that period, eligibility for sickness benefit requires certification from a GP who must assess the
ability to work (full or part time) and make a decision about sickness certification based on
this evaluation. The Norwegian Health Directorate has issued sickness certification guidelines
in order to help standardise the certification practice across GPs.17 Sickness certificates can
be issued both at a regular GP practice and at a PCEC and the procedures for issuing such
certificates are identical in both cases.
4 A dynamic model of GP practice styles
In this section we develop a dynamic model of GPs’choices of sick-listing practice styles, where
we make sure that the model is suffi ciently rich to incorporate the key institutional details of
the Norwegian primary care market. The model is used to make theoretical predictions about
how competition is likely to affect sick-listing rates, and how this relationship is likely to depend
on GP payment schemes.
A total mass of 1 infinitely lived workers are uniformly distributed on L = [0, 1]. In every
period t, each worker falls (temporarily) sick with illness severity s, which is perfectly negatively
correlated with work ability, and which is drawn (independently in each period) from a uniform
distribution with support [0, 1]. Each time a worker falls sick, he can visit a GP who might issue
a sickness certificate. The GP can correctly observe patients’ illness severity and will issue a
sickness certificate if the severity is above a threshold level ŝi := σ − βi, where σ ∈ (0, 1) is the
threshold level for issuing sickness certificates according to offi cial guidelines and βi = σ − ŝi
represents GP i’s departure from these guidelines. Thus, βi reflects GP i’s chosen practice style
for issuing sickness certificates, where a higher value of βi implies a more lenient practice style.
18
Excluding travelling costs associated with a GP visit, the utility of a patient with severity
in the interest of the employer, in some cases, to prolong sickness certification once the first 16 days have passed
(see, e.g., Fevang et al., 2014).
16There is no administrative registration of self-certified sickness absence in Norway. However, survey data
collected by Statistics Norway indicate that self-certified sickness absence rates have been stable at a level just
below 1 percent during the last 20 years (see https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/artikler-og-publikasjoner/stabilt-
sykefravaer—371775 for exact figures).
17These guidelines are available at https://helsedirektoratet.no/retningslinjer/sykmelderveileder.
18A sickness certificate is valid for a certain period of time, which is decided by the GP. However, we abstract
from this dimension of the certification decision and consider only the decision of whether or not to issue a sickness
certificate.
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s who attends a GP is a (s) if he does not obtain a sickness certificate and b (s) if he a obtains
such a certificate, where a′ (s) < 0, b′ (s) < 0 and b (s) > a (s) for all s. Thus, higher illness
severity implies lower patient utility, but, for a given severity level, a patient always prefers to
get a sickness certificate.19
There are two GPs in the market, one located at each endpoint of L. Including travelling
costs, expected utility for a worker located at z and visiting GP i, located at zi, is20






b (s) ds− τ |z − zi| , (1)
where τ > 0 is the marginal travelling cost. With little loss of generality, we parameterise the
sub-utility functions as follows: a (s) = η − s and b (s) = 1 − s, where η ∈ (0, 1). We assume
that U i (z) > 0 for all z and βi, which implies full market coverage; i.e., that every worker who
falls sick always prefers to visit a GP.21
Suppose that, at each point on the line, a share λ of workers can choose which GP to attend,
whereas each of the remaining share 1 − λ is randomly allocated to one of the GPs each time
they fall sick. If all workers are able to correctly observe the practice style of each GP, the
worker who is indifferent between GP i and GP j is located at x̂, which is implicitly defined by











The location of the indifferent worker thus depends crucially on two factors: (i) the difference in
GP practice styles (βi − βj), and (ii) the utility gain of obtaining a sickness certificate (1− η).
The potential demand for GP i from the segment of patients who make a choice of GP is
then given by λx̂. However, since practice style is diffi cult to observe ex ante, it is unrealistic to
assume that a GP who chooses a particular practice style will immediately realise his potential
demand. We assume instead that patients’ beliefs about the practice styles of the two GPs
19 If a sick worker prefers to work, he can always refrain from using the sickness certificate. Thus, a worker who
has already visited a GP can never be worse off by obtaining a sickness certificate. This means that the results
of the model would be qualitatively unaffected by assuming that some workers would be better off without a sick
leave.
20For simplicity, we assume that patient co-payments are zero. Positive patient copayments would not affect
the analysis in any way, as long as these copayments are exogenous and equal for both GPs in the market.
21This requires τ < 1
2
− σ (1− η) and σ < 1
2(1−η) .
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evolve sluggishly over time through repeated interactions and reputation. More specifically, at
each point in time, only a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of patients become aware of changes in GP practice
styles. This implies that only a fraction γ of any potential change in demand is realised at each
point in time.




+ λx (t) (3)




+ λx̂ (t) , (4)















xi (t) = γ (x̂ (t)− x (t)) . (6)
The net income of GP i at time t is a linear combination of fixed-salary income and fee-for-
service income, given by
πi (t) = θw + (1− θ) pQi (t) , (7)
where w is a fixed wage and p is the consultation fee net of monetary costs per consultation,
which for simplicity are assumed to be constant.22
In addition to net income, we also assume that each GP cares, to some extent, about patient
utility; that there is a (non-monetary) effort cost of patient consultations; and that GPs suffer a
22As described in Section 3, the payment scheme for self-employed GPs in Norway is a combination of capitation
and fee-for-service, and there is also a separate (but very low) fee for issuing a sickness certificate. In our theoretical
model, the assumption that all workers fall sick once per period implies that the net consultation fee p can be
interpreted as including capitation payment. It is straightforward to extend the model by (i) introducing a
distinction between capitation and fee-for-service payment (by assuming that each worker falls sick only with a
certain probability in each period), and (ii) introducing a separate fee for issuing a sickness certificate. However,
this would only complicate the exposition without qualitatively affecting any of the results, since all these fees
would affect GP incentives in the same way (further details available upon request). Thus, for expositional
purposes, we represent the fee-for-service payment scheme only by a single parameter, namely the net consultation
fee p.
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disutility from deviating from the offi cial sick-listing guidelines. The aggregate utility of patients
attending GP i at time t is given by
















− (1− η) ŝi (t)− τz
)
dz. (8)
The payoff of GP i at time t is then assumed to be given by
Ωi (t) = πi (t) + αVi (t)− cQi (t)−
k
2
(σ − ŝi (t))2 , (9)
where α measures the degree of altruism towards the patients, c is the (constant) marginal cost
of consultation effort, and where the last term reflects the GP’s disutility of adopting a practice
style that deviates from the offi cial guidelines. In order to make sure that the GP’s participation
constraint is satisfied for all θ ∈ [0, 1], we assume that p > c.
We consider a dynamic game where the two GPs simultaneously (and independently) choose
their practice styles (i.e., βi and βj) at each point in (continuous) time over an infinite time
horizon. This is a 2-player differential game with practice style as the control variable and
demand as the state variable. For analytical convenience, we choose the open-loop solution as
our game-theoretic solution concept. Here it is assumed that each GP knows the initial state
of the system but cannot observe the other GP’s practice style, and thus potential demand, in
subsequent periods. This implies that each GP computes his optimal plan (i.e., a sequence of
practice styles over time) at the beginning of the game and then sticks to it forever. Thus, the
optimal choice depends only on time, time-invariant parameters and initial conditions.23
The open-loop equilibrium solution is explicitly derived in Appendix A1. In the symmetric
steady state of this solution, the practice style of each GP is given by
β∗ = (1− η) λγ ((1− θ) p− c) + α (τ (γ + ρ) + λγφ)
2kτ (γ + ρ)− αλγ (1− η)2
, (10)
where ρ is the rate of time preference, and where φ := 12 − (1− η)σ−
τ
2 > 0 (by the assumption
of full market coverage). Restricting our attention to the steady-state outcome, we ask two
related questions: (i) How does the degree of competition affect GP practice styles? (ii) How
23See Brekke et al. (2012) for a similar approach to quality competition more generally.
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does the effect in (i) depend on the GP payment scheme?
Using the share of patients who choose GP as the measure of competition, the benchmark






When GPs cannot affect demand through their choice of practice style, there exists only one
incentive for GPs to adopt a practice style that deviates from the offi cial guidelines, namely
altruistic concern for patient utility at the intensive margin. A more lenient practice style
(β > 0) implies that the expected utility of patients who are allocated to the GP increases,
and a semi-altruistic GP derives some benefits from this. These marginal benefits are optimally
traded off against the marginal disutility of deviating from the offi cial guidelines. Thus, semi-
altruistic GPs will choose a strictly positive value of β, whereas purely profit-oriented GPs will
set β = 0. Furthermore, in the absence of competition, GP practice styles do not depend on the
payment scheme for GPs.
The case of free patient choice, which implies competition between the GPs, is characterised
by λ = 1. The effect of competition on GP practice styles in the steady state is then given by
∆β∗ := β∗λ=1 − β∗λ=0 = γ (1− η)
2k ((1− θ) p− c) + α
(




2kτ (γ + ρ)− αγ (1− η)2
) . (12)
The sign of this expression —which is a priori ambiguous —depends on the sign of the numerator,
which consists of two terms. The first and second term capture the effect of competition on,
respectively, the GPs’financial and altruistic incentives for the choice of practice style.
We can isolate the financial incentives by considering the case of purely profit-oriented GPs
(i.e., α = 0). In this case, we see that the sign of ∆β∗ depends crucially on the GP payment
scheme. The effect of competition on the GPs’propensity to issue sickness certificates is negative
(∆β∗ < 0) under fixed-salary contracts (θ = 1) and positive (∆β∗ > 0) under fee-for-service
contracts (θ = 0). More generally, competition leads to a more lenient GP practice style if
the financial incentives for attracting more patients are suffi ciently high-powered (i.e., if θ is
24 If λ = 0, there is no dynamic competition over time. Each GP will choose the steady-state value of β at t = 0
and stick to it forever.
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suffi ciently low). If these incentives do not exist, which is the case under fixed-salary contracts,
a purely profit-oriented GP will choose a practice style in the steady state that is stricter than the
offi cial guidelines (i.e., β∗ < 0) in an attempt to reduce demand and thereby save consultation
effort costs.25
The effect of GP altruism is captured by the second term in the numerator of (12) and
contributes unambiguously positively. The reason is that competition allows for patient utility
effects of GP practice styles at the extensive margin. By adopting a more lenient practice style,
a GP can attract more patients and thereby increase the total utility of the patients treated.
Under fee-for-service payment (θ = 0), this effect will reinforce the positive relationship between
competition and the propensity to issue sickness certificates. Under fixed-salary contracts (θ =
1), GP altruism introduces a counteracting effect. If the altruistic gain of increased patient
utility at the extensive margin is higher than the marginal consultation cost, competition leads
to a more lenient GP practice style (∆β∗ > 0) also for GPs on fixed-salary contracts.
Finally, notice that the magnitude of the competition effect on GP practice styles depends on
the size of the potential demand response to a more lenient practice style (measured by (1− η))
and by how fast actual demand adjusts to such a change in practice style (measured by γ).
The above described results are summarised as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) Under fee-for-service contracts, competition always leads to a more lenient
GP practice style. (ii) Under fixed-salary contracts, competition leads to a more lenient (stricter)
GP practice style if the degree of altruism is suffi ciently strong (weak). (iii) When facing com-
petition, a GP on fee-for-service contract is always more lenient than a GP on fixed-salary
contract.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
Data on GPs and their patients are derived from the Norwegian Health Economics Adminis-
tration (HELFO), which is responsible for the Norwegian primary care patient list scheme.26
25Since total demand is fixed, each GP always has the same demand in the symmetric steady-state equilibrium,
regardless of the competitive environment. However, when patients are free to choose their preferred GP, each
GP has a unilateral incentive to increase (decrease) demand if the marginal net benefit of doing so is positive
(negative).
26HELFO is a subordinate institution directly linked to the Norwegian Directorate of Health.
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For each patient contact (consultation), whether at the GP’s regular offi ce or at an emergency
centre, the GP sends an invoice to HELFO. The register includes information on patients’age
and gender, date and time of contact, diagnosis according to the ICPC-2-diagnosis code and
codes from a detailed tariff scheme for type of contact (including a tariff for issuing sickness
certificates). Notably, each invoice also states whether the GP is remunerated by fee-for ser-
vice or fixed salary. The register includes the same type of information regardless of where the
consultation takes place (at the GP’s own practice or in an emergency centre). HELFO also
holds a register of the regular GPs, including their age, gender, medical specialist status and
the personal identifiers of the patients on the list. From HELFO we have obtained data from
2006-2014.
Data from HELFO do not include information on patient characteristics like education and
income. This information is derived from the FD-Trygd database, which links administrative
information from the National Insurance Administration, Statistics Norway and the Directorate
of Labour. The database covers all Norwegians from 1992 onwards. Besides detailed information
on work activity, income and social security (sick leave, disability, retirement pension, etc.), the
database also includes extensive background information such as education, marital status and
number of children.
5.1 Sample
We restrict attention to the 10 most frequent diagnoses among employed patients attending
PCECs in the period 2007-2014.27 These are listed in Table 1, which also contains information
on the total number of visits at emergency centres per diagnosis.
[Table 1 here]
From HELFO we have extracted information on all consultations, whether at a regular
GP practice or at an emergency centre, where the patient was diagnosed with one of these 10
diagnoses. This amounts to a total of 6,036,580 visits over the period 2007-2014. The sample
that we use in our analysis is a subset of these visits, where sample selection is based on a
number of different considerations, which we carefully explain below.
27The explanatory variable ‘visits last year’is based on data for the period 2006-2013, therefore consultations
in 2006 cannot be included in the sample.
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Since we focus on GPs’sick-listing practice we only include patients who were employed at
the time of consultation, which reduces the total number of visits by approximately 25 percent.
Furthermore, we exclude from the sample visits to physicians not registered as a regular GP28
and visits (at a GP offi ce) to another regular GP than the one the patient is listed with.29 These
two categories constitute roughly 26 and 30 percent, respectively, of all visits.30
Another potential problem is related to visits which result in emergency hospital admissions.
In these cases, the sickness certificate might be issued at the hospital. In order to exclude such
cases we link our data on primary care visits to data from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR),
which contains (weekly) information on all admissions to secondary care in Norway. Based on
this information, we have excluded visits from patients who are registered with a hospital stay
in the same week as the primary care consultation.
In a few cases, a GP is registered both with fee-for-service and salary in a given month. If
more than 5 percent of the GP’s consultations are remunerated differently from the dominant
consultation type, we exclude the GP’s consultations for the relevant month. This could for
instance happen if the GP changes practice during a month. It concerns less than a half percent
of all consultations.
Less than 3 percent of all PCEC consultations take place during the night, and these con-
sultations are excluded from our sample. This exclusion is an attempt to reduce unobservable
patient and GP heterogeneity across consultation types. On the patient side, consultations at
emergency centres during the night is likely to involve more high-severity patients, while on the
GP side, excluding night-time consultations will exclude most of the PCEC consultations where
GPs are paid a fixed salary, ensuring a more homogeneous remuneration scheme (fee-for-service)
for the remaining PCEC consultations in the sample.31 Furthermore, we exclude consultations
where the GP is matched with one of his own list patients at an emergency centre, since it is
28These include locums, interns, junior doctors from hospitals working in emergency centres, etc.
29A patient might be seen by another GP than the one she is listed with if the patient’s regular GP is unavailable
for some reason. This is particularly frequent in GP group practices.
30Notice that these two categories are not mutually exclusive. The intersection consists of all consultations
outside emergency centres where the pasient visits a GP different from the one she is listed with, and this GP is
not registered as a regular GP.
31 It should be noted that, according to our theory model, the renumeration scheme has no impact on GP
behaviour in a situation with exogenous demand, as is the case for emergency centre consultations. We have also
estimated our empirical models on a sample where we include night-time PCEC consultations and the results
(which are available upon request) are practically identical.
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reasonable to assume the GP has incentives to behave differently in such cases.32
Our empirical strategy for identifying the effects of competition on GP behaviour, which
is explained in detail in Section 6, relies on an assumption that consultations at PCECs are
random and isolated matches between GPs and patients —who do not know each other —with
a low probability of future interactions. This is a plausible assumption in municipalities with
a suffi ciently large number of GPs, where the probability of seeing a particular GP when going
to a PCEC is very low. However, this assumption is less plausible in small municipalities, with
a limited number of GPs. Even if we exclude consultations where GPs are matched with their
own list patients at PCECs, the degree of familiarity between patients and GPs is generally
much larger in small municipalities, making the distinction between regular GP consultations
and PCEC consultations more blurry. We therefore exclude consultations that take place in
relatively small municipalities, with less than 10 GPs.
[Table 2 here]
Finally, we have also dropped a small number of patients with missing observations on some
explanatory variables. Table 2 contains information on the relative size of each of the excluded
consultation categories for each of the ten diagnoses considered.33 Our final sample contains
almost 2 million consultations.
5.2 Variables
In line with our empirical strategy (to be further explained in the next section), we classify
all consultations in our final sample into three different categories: (i) consultations where the
patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is self-employed and paid by capitation and
fee-for-service, (ii) consultations where the patient visits her own regular GP and this GP is
employed on a fixed-salary contract, and (iii) consultations which takes place at a municipal
emergency centre. These categories constitute approximately 89 percent, 1 percent and 10
percent, respectively, of the total number of consultations. For each consultation we also know
32We use this excluded category of consultations in a placebo test of our identification strategy in Section 8,
along with several other robustness checks.
33Notice that, since these categories are not mutually exclusive, the number of visits in the final sample cannot
be directly calculated from the total number of visits by using the shares of excluded visits given in Table 2.
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whether a sickness certificate has been issued and whether the consultation is a prolonged one.34
[Figures 1a and 1b here]
Figure 1a shows the frequency of each diagnosis in each category of primary care consul-
tations. For many diagnoses, their frequency is quite similar across consultation categories.
Within this set of diagnoses, we see that upper respiratory infection is the most common di-
agnosis at GP offi ces and almost equally frequent at emergency centres. On the other hand,
laceration/cut is much more common at emergency centres. These patient sample differences
will be taken care of in the empirical analysis where we control for diagnosis. Notice, however,
that the descriptive statistics on the rate of sick listing across the three categories of consulta-
tions, as depicted in Figure 1b, show a very consistent pattern. For every single diagnosis, the
sick-listing rate is highest in consultations with a regular GP on fee-for-service payment and
lowest in consultations at emergency centres.
We also include a relatively large set of GP and patient characteristics as control variables.
All variables are listed and defined in Table A.2 in the Appendix. In Table 3 we report the mean
values of all variables (summed over all diagnoses) for each of the three consultation categories.
Patients at the emergency center had a lower number of visits to a GP or an emergency centre
the previous year, but they are also somewhat younger than the average patient at the GP
offi ce. For most of the other variables, the descriptive statistics show relatively small and non-
systematic differences across consultation categories. As expected, since regular GPs above the
age of 60 are automatically exempted from the obligation to work at emergency centres, the
average GP age is somewhat lower for consultations taking place there.
[Table 3 here]
To complete the picture, we also report the mean values of the patient-level variables for a
different partition of the data, where all consultations are categorised according to whether or
not a sickness certificate was issued. These descriptive statistics, reported in Table A.3 in the
Appendix, show that patients who receive a sickness certificate are, on average, slightly younger,
with a slightly lower income, and are somewhat more likely to have low education. Overall,
34The standard time for a consultation is 20 minutes, but the consultation can be prolonged by the physician.
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though, the differences between these two groups of patients, along observable dimensions, are
not very pronounced.35
6 Empirical strategy
The (twofold) aim of our empirical analysis is (i) to estimate the causal relationship between
the degree of competition a GP is exposed to and his propensity to issue sickness certificates
to his patients, and (ii) to assess how this relationship depends on the GP payment scheme
(fixed salary versus fee-for-service). Our theoretical analysis predicts that more competition will
lead to a higher sick-listing rate if GP payment is based on fee-for-service. On the other hand,
the effect of competition on the sick-listing rate of fixed-salary GPs is positive (negative) if the
degree of GP altruism is suffi ciently strong (weak), but always smaller than the effect on the
sick-listing rate of fee-for-service GPs.
The key challenge for empirical identification is to create an exogenous measure of competi-
tion intensity. Our strategy here is to exploit the fact that the consultation-specific matching of
patients to physicians is based on patient choice at regular GP practices, whereas it is completely
random at emergency centres. This difference in ‘matching technology’has clear implications for
the nature of the competitive environment the GPs find themselves in when they work in their
own practice or in an emergency centre. When patient-physician matching is random, as is the
case in an emergency centre, the GP cannot influence his future demand, which is exogenous.
This implies that the GP is not exposed to any competition for patients and is equivalent to the
case of λ = 0 in the theory model.
On the other hand, when working in his own practice, where physician-patient matching
is a result of patient choice, the GP should realise that his treatment decisions (or ‘practice
style’) will affect both the probability that the patient chooses to remain on the GP’s list in
the future, and also, through reputation effects, the probability that new patients will choose
to be listed with the GP. This implies that the GP is exposed to competition for patients and
is equivalent to the case of λ = 1 in the theory model.36 Since the data allow us to observe
35Because of multiple visits (to a regular GP or a PCEC), with some visits resulting in a sickness certificate
and others not, the same patient might be represented in both categories of consultations in Table A.3.
36The indications of significant variation in actual patient list size over time, as shown in Table A.1, suggest
that most regular GPs are indeed exposed to competition for patients.
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the same GP in different competitive environments, being exposed (in own practice) or not (in
emergency centre) to competition, we are in principle able to isolate the effect of competition
on GP behaviour in a way that allows us to make causal inferences.37
Obviously, the above-described empirical strategy implicitly relies on the basic assumption
that the degree of GP leniency with respect to sick-listing is indeed a strategic competition
variable for GPs when working in their regular practices. Given that patients tend to value a
more lenient practice style, it seems a priori reasonable to assume that changes in the degree
of leniency will affect GP demand over time, mainly via reputation effects, as postulated in
our theoretical model. This assumption is also convincingly backed up by empirical evidence
reported by Markussen and Røed (2017). Based on a conditional logit model using Norwegian
data, they show that differences in GP leniency with respect to sick-listing have strong effects
on workers’choice of regular GP.
In order to estimate the effect of competition on physician behaviour, we employ the following
high-dimensional fixed effect model where we control for all time-invariant characteristics of
patients and physicians using the Stata module reghdfe (Correia, 2014):
yijt = ξ ∗ Typeijt + κ ∗Xijt + ψi + δj + ωt + εijt, (13)
where the dependent variable yijt is equal to 1 if GP j issues a sickness certificate to patient i
at time t, and equal to zero otherwise. According to (13), we have the following distinct sources
of variation in the dependent variable:
1. Type of consultation (Typeijt) according to the three previously defined categories.
2. Observed time-varying exogenous characteristics of patients and physicians (Xijt).
3. Time-invariant patient heterogeneity (ψi).
4. Time-invariant physician heterogeneity (δj).
37One could imagine that a patient decides to change her regular GP based on a visit at the emergency centre,
thereby creating a link between a GPs behaviour at PCEC consultations and the demand for consultations at his
regular practice. However, a significant demand effect of this kind arguably requires a certain degree of repeated
GP-patient interaction, which we largely rule out by excluding smaller municipalities from our sample. Thus,
we believe that such an effect is likely to be negligible in larger municipalities, where the probability of seeing a
particular GP at a PCEC is very small.
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5. Period-specific effects (dummy variables for year, month, day of week and hour) common
to all patients and physicians (ωt).
6. Unexplained random variation (εijt).
Our explanatory variable of main interest is type of consultation. In the analysis we use
visits to emergency centres as the baseline category, which implies that the estimated parameter
vector ξ measures the effect of exposure to competition on physicians’propensity to issue sick-
ness certificates, with separate parameter estimates depending on whether physicians have fixed
salaries or fee-for-service payments in the environment where they are exposed to competition.
GPs working at emergency centres may well differ systematically from GPs who do not on un-
observable characteristics. However, GP fixed effects capture differences between GPs regarding
their motivation for working at emergency centers, their attitudes towards the gatekeeper role
and to the usefulness of sickness absence in a therapeutic context, their degree of altruism, and
so on. Patient fixed effects, in turn, capture factors such as genetic predispositions, initial health
status including chronic disease, attitudes towards illness and work, and degree of risk aversion
regarding change of Regular GP.
A remaining potential estimation problem, though, is that patients visiting an emergency
centre might differ from patients visiting a regular GP. Even in a regression model where we
include patient, GP and time fixed effects, and where we also control for a large set of time-
varying patient and physician characteristics, the dependent variable is likely to be correlated
with the error term due to unobserved patient characteristics. However, the interpretation of
the estimation results is greatly enhanced by the fact that, although it is hard to know the size
of the patient selection bias, it is arguably easier to make conjectures about the direction of
the bias. Controlled for observable patient characteristics, it seems reasonable and intuitive to
assume that the average patient severity level is at least as high for PCEC consultations as for
regular GP consultations. Although we cannot directly observe patient severity, this conjecture
is backed by the observation that, for every diagnosis considered, the share of patients who are
sent to hospital after a primary care consultation is considerably higher for emergency centre
consultations than for regular GP consultations.38 We will return to this issue when discussing
38These figures are calculated using the data and procedure previously described in Section 5 and are reported
in Table A.4. in the Appendix.
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the robustness of our empirical results presented in the next section.
Eq. (13) is our preferred model, but we also report results from estimations of OLS models
with time-fixed and diagnoses-fixed effects, as well as from models adding GP or patient fixed
effects. When estimating GP and/or patient fixed effects specifications, we follow Correia (2015)
and drop singleton observations (i.e., GPs or patients for whom there is only one observation)
in order to ensure proper inference and improve computational effi ciency in our fixed-effect
regressions. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at GP level.
7 Results
Our main regression results are presented in Table 4, which displays results from the estimation
of four different versions of (13). As a benchmark for comparison, estimates based on pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS) are reported in Column 1 of Table 4. If we compare OLS results
with raw data sickness certification rates (Table 3), the differences in sick-listing propensity
across consultation categories are much less when we control for observable GP and patient
characteristics as well as time fixed effects. In particular, controlling for diagnosis is important,
as could be expected from the descriptive statistics (Figures 1a and 1b).
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the estimates from models with physician fixed effects and
patient fixed effects, respectively. In the model with physician fixed effects, identification of the
competition effect is based on observations of the same physician both in his own practice and at
an emergency centre. On the other hand, in the model with patient fixed effects, identification
is based on observations of the same patient visiting her regular GP and visiting an emergency
centre. Finally, in Column 4 we report estimates from our preferred empirical model with
two-way (physician and patient) fixed effects, as specified in (13).
[Table 4 here]
For our independent variables of interest, the point estimates are qualitatively similar in all
four models. When a physician works in a more competitive environment (i.e., in his own practice
instead of at an emergency centre), the physician’s propensity to issue sickness certificates is
significantly higher. Furthermore, this effect is significantly stronger if the physician has financial
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incentives to compete for patients (i.e., if the physician’s income in his own practice is based
on capitation and fee-for-service rather than a fixed salary). These effects are estimated with
a great deal of precision. In our most preferred model, exposure to competition increases the
probability of sick listing by approximately 8 percentage points if the GP is on a fixed-salary
contract, and by almost 12 percentage points if the GP is on a fee-for-service contract.39 The
estimated coeffi cients for the other covariates are all relatively small in magnitude.40
In qualitative terms, the estimated effects of competition on sick-listing rates are similar
across the four different models displayed in Table 4. However, the magnitudes of the effects are
somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of patient and physician fixed effects. This suggests that
there are unobserved and time-invariant patient and physician heterogeneities which are relevant
for the sick-listing rates. All else equal, some physicians might be more lenient than others in
their sick-listing practice, whereas the demand for sickness certification might be higher from
some patients than from others. Compared with the OLS estimates, the inclusion of physician
fixed effects tends to increase the magnitude of the estimated coeffi cients, particularly for salaried
physicians. On the other hand, the inclusion of patient fixed effects tends to reduce the estimated
effects of competition. This suggests that more lenient physicians are overrepresented in PCEC
consultations, whereas patients with higher demand for sickness certification are overrepresented
in regular GP consultations.
The estimated effect of competition on the sick-listing practice of fee-for-service GPs, who
have financial incentives to attract patients, serves as a strong confirmation of the prediction
from our theoretical model. The finding of a considerably stronger effect for these GPs than
for fixed-salary GPs is also in accordance with the theoretical analysis. However, our theory
predicts that the sign of the competition effect is a priori ambiguous for fixed-salary GPs, with
a positive (negative) effect if the degree of altruism is suffi ciently strong (weak). The empirical
finding of a significantly positive effect also for this group of GPs suggests, in light of the theory,
that the degree of altruism among fixed-salary GPs is relatively high. This might be partly
39Using an F-test, we confirm that the effects of competition on physicians’sick-listing practice are siginificantly
different (in all four models) for the two types of GPs (fixed salary vs. fee-for-service).
40 In Table A.5 in the Appendix we report separate estimates of (13) for each of the ten diagnoses given in Table
1. The effect of competition on sick-listing rates is significantly positive for most of the diagnoses, particularly
for GPs on fee-for-service contracts, although the results across diagnoses are not perfectly consistent, which is
fairly expected, given the considerably reduced number of observations on which each estimation is based.
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explained by a selection effect that is not fully accounted for in our empirical models. When
the Regular General Practitioner Scheme was introduced in 2001, the GPs who were already on
a fixed-salary contract were given the right to keep their position as employed GPs earning a
fixed salary. Thus, the type of GP (fee-for-service vs. fixed salary) is to some extent a result
of the GPs’own choice and we cannot rule out the possibility that the two types of GPs differ
along some unobservable dimension. One possible self-selection criterion, which seems intuitively
plausible, is that the more profit-oriented GPs opted for a self-employment contract (capitation
and fee-for-service) whereas the more altruistic ones opted to remain on a fixed-salary contract.
8 Robustness and extensions
In this section we assess the validity of our results in three different ways. First, we address
some potential selection biases in our main analysis and check whether our results are robust
to different sample selection criteria that help correcting for these biases. Second, we explore
whether our identifying strategy produces heterogeneous effects along dimensions that are likely
to affect the scope for competition. If the effects are stronger in contexts where the scope for
competition is larger, this provides confirmation that our empirical strategy is really capturing
a competition effect. Finally, we design a placebo test where we compare GPs’practice styles at
their own GP practices with the practice style towards their own list patients at the emergency
centres, which is a way to eliminate the competition effect which, we claim, is explaining our
main results (Table 4). All results in this section are derived from our preferred empirical model
with two-way (GP and patient) fixed effects.
8.1 Selection bias
As mentioned in Section 6, our results might be affected by patient selection bias due to unob-
served systematic differences between patients who visit an emergency centre and patients who
visit their regular GP. However, as previously argued, such a bias —if it still remains after con-
trolling for both time-varying and time-invariant heterogeneity —is likely to be in the direction
of sicker patients attending emergency centres, which implies that, absent the competition effect,
the rate of sick listing should be higher at emergency centres than at regular GP practices. Thus,
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the fact that we find significantly lower sick-listing rates at emergency centres suggests that we
are, if anything, underestimating the positive effect of competition on physicians’propensity to
issue sickness certificates.
However, we can also identify several other potential biases that might work in the opposite
direction. In Table 5 we present a series of results (in Columns 2-6) where we aim to correct
for each of these biases by different sample selection criteria. For ease of comparison, we also
reproduce our main results based on the full sample (from Table 4) in the first column of Table
5. All results in Table 5 are estimated using our preferred empirical specification with both
patient and GP fixed-effects.
[Table 5 here]
(i) One potential bias is related to the fact that the degree of familiarity between physician
and patient is likely to be higher in a regular GP consultation, at least on average. This
might have two different effects on the physician’s decision of whether or not to issue a sickness
certificate. First, higher familiarity is likely to improve diagnostic accuracy; i.e., the better the
GP knows the patient, the more likely he is to observe the true severity level of the patient.
However, there is no particular reason to believe that this will create a bias in our analysis.
For any given GP practice style (i.e., sick-listing threshold), the inability to diagnose accurately
can create two types of mistakes: the GP issues sickness certificates to patients who should not
have been sick listed, and patients who should have been sick listed do not obtain a sickness
certificate. Improved diagnosis accuracy will reduce both types of mistakes and there is no a
priori reason to believe that the net effect is systematically different from zero. However, higher
familiarity between physician and patient might also make the physician more prone to give
the patient a sickness certificate in borderline cases. A GP might simply find it more diffi cult
to deny patients he knows well a sickness certificate. In the context of our theoretical model,
this effect could be interpreted as the GP acting more altruistic towards patients when there is
higher familiarity between physician and patient, as would be the case in the context of patient
choice (λ = 1).
All else equal, the ‘familiarity effect’might create a bias in the direction of lower sick-listing
rates at emergency centres, counteracting the aforementioned patient selection bias. Notice,
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however, that the potential bias due to familiarity between physician and patient is in principle
the same for both types of GPs (fixed salary and fee-for-service). The fact that we find a
considerably stronger response to competition for fee-for-service GPs than for fixed-salary GPs
suggests, in light of our theoretical model, that our results cannot be fully explained by such a
bias.
However, we can address this issue more closely by restricting our sample to consultations
involving only GPs with new practices, which we define as practices that have been run by the
GP for at most 12 months. Since the number of GP practices within the NHS is regulated,
these ‘new practices’are mainly existing practices that have been taken over by another GP
when the GP previously running the practice retired, moved, or for other reasons decided to
give up the practice. In these cases, the GP who takes over the practice inherits the patient
list of the previous GP. At least for the first few months, the degree of GP-patient familiarity
in new practices should be very low. Thus, by restricting the sample to consultations involving
GPs with new practices, it is reasonable to assume that we reduce any potential familiarity bias
to the point where it becomes negligible.41 Descriptive statistics of this sample are presented in
Table A.6 in the Appendix.
The results from the estimation of (13), using the above described sample, are reported in
Column 2 of Table 5. We see that the effect of competition on GPs with fee-for-service contracts
is still highly significant and very similar in magnitude compared with the result from the main
analysis (Column 1). In contrast, the point estimate for fixed-salary GPs is close to zero and also
loses its statistical significance. These results suggest that, at least for GPs on fee-for-service
contracts, our main results are not biased by any differences in GP-patient familiarity between
GPs working in their own practice and in PCECs. If there is such a bias, it seems to affect
almost exclusively the fixed-salary GPs, although the loss of precision in the estimate might be
explained by the relatively low number of observations.
(ii) Another potential bias is related to renewals of sickness certificates. Since these are
issued with a certain time limit, which can often be quite restricted, a certain share of the
41One potential caveat with this strategy is that GPs with new practices might have stronger incentives (than
GPs with older practices) to adopt a more lenient sick-listing practice in order to prevent exits from the patient
list. This might be the case if the switching cost of a patient is an increasing function of the time the patient has
been on the GP’s list.
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total patient mass, in particular those with a more long-term disease, might visit a GP simply
to have their sickness certificate renewed. If, for a given sickness episode, the probability of
having a sickness certificate renewed is higher than the probability of obtaining the first sickness
certificate, and if renewals of sickness certificates mainly take place at a regular GP practice,
this could create a bias in the direction of higher sick listing by regular GPs, implying that our
competition effects might be overestimated.
We correct for this potential bias by excluding consultations involving patients who were
already on sick leave at the time of the consultation. The corresponding results are reported
in Column 3 of Table 5, which reveal that the estimated coeffi cients are somewhat reduced
in magnitude, suggesting that our main results might be slightly biased by including patients
already on sick leave. Still, though, the effects of exposure to competition are relatively large,
very precisely estimated, and significantly larger for fee-for-service GPs than for fixed-salary
GPs.
(iii) A third potential bias stems from the possibility that given illness episode might involve
multiple ordered visits, with a regular GP visit subsequent to a PCEC visit. We can think of
two different sources of such an ‘ordering bias’. First, there might be cases where a GP at an
emergency centre asks the patient to visit the regular GP in order to get a sickness certificate.
Such cases might potentially arise if the sickness certification decision is a borderline one, where
the emergency centre GP is more comfortable leaving this decision to the patient’s own GP.
Second, a patient might visit an emergency centre at the start of an illness period and then,
subsequently, go to the regular GP to obtain a sickness certificate only at the end of the self-
certification period. In both cases, the ordering bias might contribute to our competition effects
being overestimated.
We address the potential ordering bias by excluding consultations where the same patient
visits a regular GP within a short period (eight days) of visiting an emergency centre.42 The
results from estimations of (13) with this sample restrictions are given in Column 4 of Table 5.
The point estimates are highly significant and very similar in magnitude to the ones obtained
42Given the acute nature of the diagnoses considered, a window of eight days should be more than enough to
exclude cases related to the first potential source of the ordering bias. Furthermore, since this window corresponds
to the maximum length of the self-certification period, cases related to the second potential source of this bias is,
by definition, also excluded.
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from the main sample, which suggests that this bias is negligible.
(iv) A fourth potential bias is related to sickness during vacations. All else equal, the
probability of attending an emergency centre instead of the regular GP is arguably higher during
vacations, since patients are more likely to be away from home in these periods. If the demand
for sickness certificates is also lower during vacations, this could create a bias that, once more,
leads to overestimation of the competition effect. It should be stressed, though, that it is far from
clear that the demand for sickness certificates is much lower during vacations. The reason is that
employees in Norway are, under certain conditions, entitled to having their vacation postponed
when becoming ill during vacation. For most of the period of our analysis, the conditions for
having the vacation postponed are that the sickness certification is ‘ungraded’(i.e., with a 100
percent replacement rate) and that the duration of the sickness spell is at least 6 working days.43
Nevertheless, we can address any concerns about a potential ‘vacation bias’more directly
by excluding consultations taking place in June/July and during Christmas and Easter, which
are the main vacation periods in Norway. The results are given in Column 5 of Table 5 and
we see that the estimated coeffi cients are practically unaffected by these exclusions, providing
reassuring evidence that our main results are not affected by a potential vacation bias.
Finally, we also perform a different test for potential selection bias related to patient severity.
There are several possible reasons why a patient might choose to attend a PCEC instead of
attending her regular GP. One reason might be that the GP is temporarily unavailable. By
including only daytime PCEC consultations on weekdays in which the patient’s regular GP is
not at the offi ce, we can construct a subsample of consultations in which PCEC visits are, on
average, more likely to be motivated by lack of regular GP availability.44 This subsample is
arguably less likely to suffer from selection bias related to patient severity, since the availability
of a GP on a given weekday is clearly uncorrelated with the average severity level of the patients
who happen to fall ill on that particular day. The estimated effects of competition, using this
subsample, are presented in the sixth and final column of Table 5. Once more, the point estimates
are quite similar to the estimates based on the main sample (Column 1), particularly for fee-
43The latter condition was abolished on July 1, 2014.
44 In our sample we have 25,741 PCEC visits taking place during the normal opening hours of regular GPs.
Around 55 percent of these visits took place on days in which the patient’s regular GP did not work, which suggest
that GP unavailability is an important reason why patients choose to attend PCECs.
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for-service GPs. This serves as a further indication that our main results are not particularly
affected by selection bias.
8.2 Heterogeneous effects
Our empirical strategy is based on the assumption that the main difference between emergency
centre consultations and regular GP consultations, that is not controlled for in our empirical
model, is the difference in GP-patient ‘matching technology’for the two types of consultations,
which implies that GPs are exposed to competition when they work in their own practice but
not when they work at an emergency centre. If this assumption is correct, we would expect
to find stronger effects of competition in situations where the scope for competition is larger.
We assess the validity of our key identifying assumption by estimating our preferred empirical
model on various subsamples that differ with respect to the scope for competition.
We start out by exploring the role of relative scarcity of GP supply. All else equal, it is
reasonable to assume that the scope for competition is inversely related to GP scarcity, which
prompts us to use the number of GPs per patients (in a given municipality) as a measure of
the scope for competition. Notice that the number of GP practices in each municipality is set
by a national regulator and is therefore exogenous to GP behaviour, which allows us to obtain
exogenous variation in the scope for competition across different municipalities. After ranking
all municipalities (with at least 10 GPs) according to the number of GPs per patient, we create
three equally sized categories of municipalities and estimate (13) on each of these three sub-
samples separately. The results, reported in Table 6, show that the magnitude of the estimated
competition effect is clearly correlated with the scope for competition (inversely measured by
GP scarcity), and where the sign of this correlation has the expected sign. This applies partic-
ularly to fee-for-service GPs, where the estimated competition effect in municipalities with the
lowest GP scarcity is, on average, 65 percent larger than the equivalent effect in municipalities
with the highest GP scarcity. We take this as reassuring confirmation of the validity of our key
identifying assumption.
[Table 6 here]
Another potential measure of the scope for competition is based on individual GP practice
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characteristics, more precisely whether the GP’s patient list is full or not. As illustrated by our
theoretical model, if competition leads to higher sick-listing rates, as we find in our empirical
analysis, this result is driven by each GP’s desire to attract more patients. Since it is only
possible for GPs with open patient lists to attract new patients, we would expect that the effect
of competition is primarily driven by the behaviour of these GPs.45 However, a naïve comparison
of competition effects for GPs with open versus closed patient lists is susceptible to an obvious
endogeneity problem, since a closed patient list might be a result of high demand because of a
lenient sick-listing practice. We can deal with this endogeneity by once more considering only
GPs with new practices, whose current demand does not depend on previous behaviour (by the
same GP).
[Table 7 here]
In Table 7 we report the results from estimating (13) on two sub-samples of GPs with new
practices, defined according to whether or not the patient list is open. The results are clearly in
line with our initial conjectures. Regardless of whether we consider only GPs with closed lists or
only GPs with open lists, the competition effect is significantly stronger for fee-for-service GPs
than for fixed-salary GPs. Furthermore, whether we consider only fee-for-service GPs or only
fixed-salary GPs, the competition effect is significantly stronger for GPs with open lists than for
GPs with closed lists. Interestingly, though the estimate is based on relatively few observations,
fixed-salary GPs with closed patient lists respond to competition by adopting a significantly
stricter sicklisting practice. Once more, we take these results as confirmation of the validity of
our empirical strategy for identification.
8.3 A placebo test
Our empirical identification strategy is based on the assumption that GPs have incentives to
behave differently when GP-patient matching is based on patient choice than when it is random.
In other words, GPs have incentives to adopt a different practice style towards patients in their
own practice than towards randomly matched patients at an emergency centre. However, this
45This does not mean GPs with closed patient lists are unaffected by competition, since GP behaviour might also
be motivated by the desire to avoid losing existing patients. However, it seems entirely plausible that competition
has a lower impact on the behaviour of GPs that are capacity constrained.
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logic does not apply in cases where a randomly matched patient at an emergency centre happens
to be one of the GP’s own list patients. In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the GP’s
behaviour might affect the patient’s decision to remain on the GP’s list, and that the GP
takes this into account in the sick-listing decision. Thus, all else equal, we would not expect
GPs’behaviour towards their own list patients to depend on the physical premises in which the
consultations takes place (own GP practice versus emergency centre), which is why consultations
with the GP’s own list patients at emergency centres were excluded from the main sample.
In order to test the above logic, we restrict our sample such that consultations at emergency
centres only include the GPs’own list patients and re-estimate (13) using this restricted sample.
As argued above, this sample restriction should in principle eliminate the competition effect
and we can therefore interpret it as a placebo test of our identification strategy. If, by using
this restricted sample, we obtain results similar to the ones reported in Table 4, then our main
results must be explained by some other (unobserved) differences between the two consultation
types that are not related to competition.46
[Table 8 here]
Estimation results from the restricted sample (using both GP and patient fixed effects)
are presented in Table 8. We see that the difference in sick-listing probabilities for the two
consultation types vanishes for fixed-salary GPs and is dramatically reduced (from 12 to 4
percentage points) for fee-for-service GPs. These results serve as added confirmation that our
identification strategy is capturing a competition effect with a fairly high degree of precision. It
is also quite plausible that the remaining difference (of 4 percentage points) in sick-listing rates
between GP practice consultations and PCEC consultations can be explained by the fact that a
GP working at an emergency centre might not always recognise his own list patients when they
are randomly allocated to him. A failure to recognise own list patients should be particularly
likely for GPs with relatively large patient lists. We explore this hypothesis by splitting the
sample of consultations (from which the results in Table 8 are derived) according to whether
the GPs’actual list size is above or below the average list size (1350 patients). The estimated
results from these two sub-samples are presented in the second and third columns of Table 8 and
46Notice that our results in Section 8.1 (Table 5) rule out ‘familiarity bias’as a potential explanation of our
main results.
32
show that, although the estimated coeffi cient is (weakly) significant for fee-for-service GPs in
both subsamples, the magnitude of the coeffi cient is smaller for GPs with shorter patient lists,
which serves as partial confirmation of our hypothesis.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the impact of competition among physicians on their service provision,
and how this relationship depends on financial incentives. Despite the fact that almost every
country has a market-based allocation of physician services, compelling empirical evidence on
the effects of competition is sparse. A key challenge is to obtain exogenous variation in the degree
of competition in physician markets. In this paper we address this challenge by exploiting the
fact that many GPs, in addition to their regular practice, work in primary care emergency
centres. This allows us to observe the same GP in two different competitive environments: (i)
with competition (regular practice) and (ii) without competition (emergency centre). Thus, our
empirical strategy is to exploit within-GP variation in the degree of competition, using the GP’s
service provision at the emergency centre as a benchmark to identify the effect of competition.
From rich administrative data with detailed patient level information in Norway over nine
years (2006 to 2016), we select a sample of the ten most frequent acute diagnoses treated by
GPs. As the outcome variable we use the GPs’propensity to certify (paid) sick leave to patients,
which is a highly frequent and standardised ‘treatment’for acute diagnoses. Our main empirical
finding is that GPs are more likely to issue sickness certificates to patients that visit them
at their regular practice than at the emergency centre. The strength of this effect depends
crucially on the GPs’financial incentives. Estimates from our preferred empirical model show
that GPs with an activity-based (i.e., combination of fee-for-service and capitation) contract are
12 percentage points more likely to offer a sick leave to their patients in their regular practice
than at the emergency centre. For GPs with fixed-salary contracts, the corresponding figure is
only 8 percentage points. We therefore conclude that exposing GPs to competition has a positive
impact on their propensity to sick list patients, which is strongly reinforced by high-powered
activity-based financial incentives.
Although our empirical strategy allows us to identify exogenous variation in the degree of
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physician competition, a remaining challenge is to control for other factors (than competition)
that may affect the GPs’service provision in the two competitive environments. The detail and
richness of our data allow us to estimate a high-dimensional fixed effect model controlling for
(observed and unobserved) time-invariant patient, GP and diagnosis heterogeneity, in addition
to a wide set of observable patient and GP characteristics. In order to deal with potential
estimation biases stemming from any remaining (time-variant) heterogeneity, we first establish
the likely direction of the most obvious bias, namely that patient severity is likely to be higher
at emergency centres than at GP practices, all else equal. This suggests that we underestimate
the true effects of competition and therefore serves as a validation of the qualitative nature of
our results. As a further validation, we carefully re-estimate our empirical model varying the
sample selection criteria in order to account for any conceivable remaining biases caused by
unobserved heterogeneity. Reassuringly, our main results hold up well when being exposed to
such a falsification exercise.
Finally, we also validate our results and empirical strategy by testing if our results vary
according to different measures of the scope for competition. In line with our predictions, we
find that the effects of competition are considerably larger (i) in municipalities with more GPs
(measured by the number of GPs per patient) and (ii) for GPs with spare capacity (i.e., GPs
with open patient lists).
Our main results accord with the predictions from a dynamic model of semi-altruistic physi-
cians who face demand that evolves over time depending on their chosen practice styles (i.e.,
their leniency towards issuing sickness certificates). A key insight from this model is that the
response to competition from a salaried GP is a priori ambiguous and depends on the degree of
altruism. Our finding of a positive effect of competition also for this type of GPs suggests that
GP preferences are characterised by a suffi cient degree of altruism.
Although our results are consistent with a scenario where GP preferences are similar across
different payment schemes (which is the assumption in our theoretical model), the relatively
small difference between the responses of the two GP types might also be partly explained
by self-selection of more profit-oriented GPs into fee-for-service payment schemes. Compared
with having a salaried position, being a self-employed GP (with fee-for-service and capitation
payment) is potentially much more profitable but also entails much more risk. It might therefore
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be the case that more profit-oriented GPs tend to select themselves into self-employed practices,
implying that the average degree of altruism is relatively higher among salaried GPs. However,
absent any observable proxy for GP altruism, it is not possible to test this hypothesis directly.
The welfare effects and thus policy implications of our findings are not clear-cut. On the one
hand, exposing GPs to (more) competition leads to more sick listing, which results in higher
expenditures for the employer and the social insurance scheme. In addition, sickness absence
has a direct negative impact on labour market productivity, all else equal. On the other hand,
sick leave improves patients’utility by allowing them to not show up at work when ill and in
most cases improving their recovery from illness. This may also have an indirect positive effect
on labour market productivity given that their health condition is improved. While competition
induces the GPs to become more lenient, we cannot say whether they are too lenient from a
social welfare perspective. One could possibly argue that the treatment at emergency centres,
where a GP’s sick listing is not distorted by competition, defines a ‘gold standard’given that
GPs in this case act as perfect gatekeepers, balancing patient utility and societal expenditures.
However, absence of competition may also involve adverse treatment effects, for instance due to
low diagnosing efforts by GPs.
The above discussion illustrates a more general insight, namely that non-price competition
can be excessive and lead to overutilisation of resources, from a social welfare perspective, when
the costs of these resources are not fully internalised in the market. In the case of sick listing,
the costs are not (fully) borne by either the physician or the patient. In general, the potential for
competition-driven overutilisation of resources exists for any non-price dimension along which
physicians compete. Our empirical results indicate that the effect of competition on physician
behaviour is of sizeable magnitude. Furthermore, we show that these effects are significantly
interlinked with the financial incentives inherent in different physician payment schemes. These
results suggest that policies towards competition and patient choice in primary care markets
should be seen in conjunction with the design of the physician payment schemes, and that the
appropriate policy response to adverse competition effects might be to redesign payment schemes
rather than to restrict patient choice.
A complete welfare analysis of the effect of physician competition requires a careful estimation
on the effects on expenditures and patient utility (including health outcomes and labour market
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productivity). Unfortunately, our data do not allow for this, so we leave this issue for future
research.
Appendix
Variation in regular GPs’patient list size
Table A.1 shows the variation in preferred and actual patient list size for regular GPs during
the period 2007-2014.
[Table A.1 here]
The open-loop solution of the theory model in Section 4







subject to the dynamic constraint47
·
x (t) = γ (x̂ (t)− x (t)) (A2)
and the initial condition
x (0) = x0 > 0. (A3)
Let µi (t) denote the current-value co-state variable associated with the state equation (A2).
The current-value Hamiltonian is then given by48
















47Since total demand is fixed, both GPs face the same dynamic constraint; i.e., the demand dynamics for GP
i automatically determine the demand for GP j.
48 In order to save space, we henceforth drop the time indicator t.
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(1− η) (ατ (1− λ+ 2λx) + µiγ)
2τ
− kβi = 0, (A5)
·
µi = ρµi −
∂Hi
∂x
= (ρ+ γ)µi − λ
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in addition to the transversality condition limt→+∞ e−ρtµi (t)x (t) = 0. The second-order condi-
tions are satisfied if the Hamiltonian is concave in its control and state variables, which requires
k > αλτ (1− η)
2.













βi = 0. (A8)









 (1− η) (α (λγ (2σ (1− η)− 1) + 2τ (λ (2γ + ρ)− (γ + ρ)))− 2λγ ((1− θ) p− c))
+4kτ (γ + ρ)βi − 2αλγ (1− η)2 βj − 2αλτ (1− η) (3γ + 2ρ)x
 .
(A9)
which, together with (A7), describes the dynamics of the equilibrium.49 The symmetric steady-
state GP practice style, given by (10) in Section 4, is found by setting
·
βi = 0, βi = βj and
x = 12 .
List of variables
The variables used in the estimation of (13) are listed and defined in Table A.2.
[Table A.2 here]
49 It is straightforward to verify that the second-order condition k > αλ
τ
(1− η)2 is also suffi cient to ensure
saddle-point stability of the open-loop solution.
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Characteristics of patients who receive (or not) a sickness certificate
In Table A.3 we report patient characteristics for two different categories of consultations, defined
according to whether or not a sickness certificate is issued.
[Table A.3 here]
Share of consultations where patients are hospitalised
Table A.4 shows, for each diagnosis and for each consultation type, the share of consultations
involving patients who are registered with a hospital stay in the same week as the primary care
consultation.
[Table A.4 here]
Regression results per diagnosis
Table A.5 presents the results from separate estimations of (13) for each of the ten diagnoses
listed in Table 1. For space-saving purposes, only the independent variables of interest are
included in the table.
[Table A.5 here]
Descriptive statistics for GPs with new practices
Table A.6 displays descriptive statistics for the subset of consultations involving GPs with new
(≤ 12 months) practices.
[Table A.6 here]
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Table 1. The ten most frequent diagnoses at primary care emergency centres 2007-2014 (employed 
patients only). 
ICPC-2 Diagosis Number of visits 
A11 Chest pain NOS1 61,255 
D01 Abdominal pain/cramps general  134,012 
L81 Injury musculoskeletal NOS 71,390 
R05 Cough 56,930 
R74  Upper respiratory infection acute 174,812 
R75  Sinusitis acute/chronic 87,081 
R76  Tonsillitis acute 56,763 
R78 Acute bronchitis/bronchiolitis 57,819 
S18 Laceration/cut  153,081 
U71 Cystitis/urinary infection other  182,994 






























Table 2. Visits excluded from the sample (as percentage of all visits to primary care physicians). 





























Chest pain 290,557 32.11 32.29 22.57 21.25 0.42 8.50 0.30 21.65 75,578 
Abdominal pain/cramps  845,866 31.59 26.47 24.47 13.79 0.41 5.55 0.25 21.84 257,697 
Injury musculoskeletal 349,593 23.02 22.77 23.79 19.39 0.67 3.24 0.36 27.72 107,475 
Cough 682,527 26.96 24.33 35.40 0.009 0.41 0.96 0.20 24.65 228,285 
Upper respiratory infection 1,268,854 18.16 25.82 35.75 0.008 0.36 1.02 0.24 20.35 479,105 
Sinusitis acute/chronic 688,042 19.16 22.06 31.68 0.007 0.46 0.79 0.31 22.90 267,755 
Tonsillitis acute 192,812 18.21 28.51 30.72 0.035 0.57 1.94 0.36 21.33 66,356 
Acute bronchitis/bronchiolitis 562,904 26.37 19.11 28.93 0.010 0.34 1.13 0.35 23.89 206,722 
Laceration/cut  321,922 27.40 40.07 23.14 0.061 0.49 11.40 0.57 27.54 68,461 
Cystitis/urinary infection, other  833,483 30.32 29.54 31.98 0.019 0.48 2.86 0.33 22.48 235,916 
All diagnoses 6,036,580 25.04 26.18 30.34 0.052 0.43 2.96 0.30 22.86 1,993,350 
1 Patients enlisted to a GP (99.6 % of the Norwegian population). 2 Visit to a GP other than the one the patient is enlisted to. 3 Emergency admission to hospital the same week 
as the visit to primary care physician. 4 Visit to a GP who is registered with both fee-for-service and fixed-salary contracts in the same month. 5 Visits where a patient meets 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics per consultation type (all diagnoses)  
 Regular GP  
(fee-for-service) 




Sickness certificate 0.365 0.269 0.140 
Prolonged consultation 0.197 0.192 0.175 
Patient characteristics    
Male 0.374 0.328 0.386 
Age 41.188 (12.477) 36.045 (12.991) 37.722 (12.394) 
Visits last year 2.482 (2.377) 2.182 (2.171) 2.135 (2.338) 
Low education 0.212 0.180 0.218 
Medium education 0.423 0.370 0.439 
High education 0.368 0.450 0.342 
Labour income 40.244 (25.013) 31.957 (20.640) 38.062 (25.124) 
White collar 0.455 0.339 0.413 
Married 0.451 0.355 0.404 
Unmarried 0.399 0.544 0.473 
Divorced 0.149 0.101 0.123 
Children 0-5 0.210 0.181 0.246 
Children 6-17 0.215 0.151 0.210 
GP characteristics    
Male 0.688 0.500 0.774 
Age 50.112 (9.661) 47.741 (11.944) 43.355 (8.811) 
Specialist 0.687 0.567 0.495 
Observations 1,771,724 24,352 197,274 
Patients 788,355 14,965 169,413 
























Table 4. Effect of competition on GP sick listing. 







GP and patient 
        (4) 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.1392*** 0.1436*** 0.1151*** 0.1183*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0044) 
     
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0592*** 0.1062*** 0.0706*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0152) (0.0096) (0.0131) 
     
Prolonged consultation -0.0033 -0.0108*** -0.0001 -0.0009 
 (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
     
Visits last year 0.0105*** 0.0093*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     
Male -0.0181*** -0.0182***   
 (0.0013) (0.0011)   
     
Age -0.0018*** -0.0015***   
 (0.0001) (0.0001)   
     
Medium education -0.0477*** -0.0376***   
 (0.0013) (0.0012)   
     
High education -0.0687*** -0.0613***   
 (0.0017) (0.0014)   
     
Labour income 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     
White collar -0.0288*** -0.0299***   
 (0.0011) (0.0010)   
     
Unmarried 0.0149*** 0.0154*** 0.0074 0.0068 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
     
Divorced 0.0353*** 0.0321*** 0.0150*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
     
Children 0-5 -0.0240*** -0.0241*** -0.0302*** -0.0290*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
     
Children 6-17 -0.0050*** -0.0025* -0.0117*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
     
GP age 0.0001  0.0003*  
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
     
GP male -0.0205***  -0.0172***  
 (0.0036)  (0.0025)  
     
GP specialist 0.0026 -0.0044 0.0011 -0.0033 
 (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0036) 
     
Observations 1,993,350 1,993,306 1,554,107 1,554,042 
Dropped singleton observations 0 44 439,243 439,308 
Patients 883,881 883,857 444,639 444,620 
GPs 4,264 4,220 4,230 4,183 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.005 
R2 adjusted 0.126 0.159 0.319 0.323 
R2 within - 0.088 0.047 0.046 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary)   
***, **, *: significant at 0.1, 1 and 5 percent level. Standard errors clustered at the GP level. 
 
 
Table 5. Effect of competition on GP sick listing: Sensitivity analyses.  
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Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0825*** -0.0027 0.0655*** 0.0767*** 0.0804*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0685) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0154) (0.0242) 
       
Observations 1,554,042 63,352 1,367,288 1,539,848 1,230,280 1,391,852 
Dropped singleton obs. 439,308 85,907 441,392 440,888 420,308 401,220 
Patients 444,620 24,520 413,718 442,170 373,293 402,742 
GPs 4,183 1,536 4,176 4,180 4,144 3,970 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Patient fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.005 0.081 0.028 0.006 0.031 0.420 
R2 adjusted 0.323 0.379 0.324 0.324 0.327 0.324 
R2 within 0.046 0.034 0.053 0.047 0.047 0.046 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary). 






Table 6. Effect of competition on GP sick listing: Number of GPs per patients (in 1000). 
 Less than 0.79 GPs 
per 1000 patients 
 
(1) 
Between 0.79 and 
0.87 GPs per 1000 
patients 
 (2) 
More than  
0.87 GPs per 1000 
patients 
 (3) 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.0943*** 0.1386*** 0.1561*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0096) 
    
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0457 0.0970*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0154) (0.0294) 
    
Observations 830,422 700,111 226,755 
Dropped singleton observations 238,479 224,338 123,485 
Patients 236,401 204,341 66,293 
GPs 1,991 2,385 971 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Patient fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.078 0.004 0.014 
R2 adjusted 0.331 0.312 0.311 
R2 within 0.053 0.039 0.036 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary). 




Table 7. Effect of competition on GP sick listing: GPs with new practices; open vs. closed lists. 
 Closed patient list 
                     (1) 
Open patient list 
(2) 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) -0.2727 0.0907*** 
 (0.2969) (0.0257) 
   
Regular GP (fixed salary) -0.7252** 0.0373 
 (0.2478) (0.0934) 
   
Observations 10,134 51,041 
Dropped singleton observations 15,361 72,723 
Patients 4,039 19,735 
GPs 291 1,255 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes 
Patient fixed effects Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effect  Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.002 0.565 
R2 adjusted 0.363 0.384 
R2 within 0.029 0.034 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary). 




Table 8. Effect of competition on GP sick listing: GPs’ own list-patients only. 
 All GPs 
                     (1) 
List length <  
1350 patients 
(2) 
List length >=  
1350 patients 
(2) 
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 0.0398*** 0.0345* 0.0490** 
 (0.0127) (0.0176) (0.0196) 
    
Regular GP (fixed salary) 0.0163 0.0095 0.0343 
 (0.0277) (0.0449) (0.0362) 
    
Observations 1,403,467 645,459 708.092 
Dropped singleton observations 398,929 231,725 217,120 
Patients 404,315 196,389 205,232 
GPs 3,900 2,898 1,507 
Time fixed effects1 Yes Yes Yes 
GP fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Patient fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnoses fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F2 0.352 0.555 0.632 
R2 adjusted 0.324 0.328 0.331 
R2 within 0.046 0.045 0.042 
1 Dummy variables for year, month, week and hour. 2 F-test: Reg. GP (fee-for-service) = Reg. GP (fixed salary). 






























Table A.1. Variation in preferred and actual patient list size for regular GPs 
 Mean  Std.Dev. 
Regular GP (fee-for-service)   
Preferred list size 1288.6  
       Between  351.1 
       Within  95.2 
Actual list size 1231.0  
       Between  386.6 
       Within  111.0 
Regular GP (fixed salary)   
Preferred list size 974.1  
       Between  304.6 
       Within  116.3 
Actual list size 849.5  
       Between  319.2 

































Table A.2. Variable definitions 
Consultation characteristics     
Regular GP (fee-for-service) 1 if visit to regular GP on fee-for-service contract 
Regular GP (fixed salary) 1 if visit to regular GP on fixed-salary contract 
Emergency centre  1 if visit at a primary care emergency center 
Sickness certificate 1 if the physician issues a sickness certificate during consultation   
Prolonged consultation  1 if the consultation is prolonged (beyond 20 minutes) 
GP characteristics 
Male 1 if the GP is male 
Age  Age of GP 
Specialist 1 if the GP is specialist in general practice 
Patient characteristics     
Male 1 if the patient is male 
Age Patient’s age 
Low education 1 if compulsory schooling 
Medium education 1 if upper secondary education 
High education 1 if higher education 
Labour income Patient’s labour income (in 10,000 NOK) 
Married 1 if the patient is married 
Unmarried 1 if the patient is unmarried 
Divorced 1 if the patient is divorced/widow/widower 
Children 0-5 1 if the patient has children 0-5 years old 
Children 6-17 1 if the patient has children 6-17 years old 

















Table A.3. Descriptive statistics of patients in consultations with and without sickness certification 
 Consultations with  
sickness certification 
Consultations without  
sickness certification 
Patient characteristics   
Male 0.383 0.371 
Age 39.818 (12.070) 41,282 (12.732) 
Visits last year 2.602 (2.331) 2.362 (2.391) 
Low education 0.251 0.192 
Medium education 0.423 0.422 
High education 0.326 0.386 
Labour income 38.794 (18.475) 40.514 (27.766) 
White collar 0.409 0.471 
Married 0.411 0.463 
Unmarried 0.437 0.394 
Divorced 0.152 0.143 
Children 0-5 0.214 0.213 
Children 6-17 0.209 0.217 
Observations 680,462 1,312,888 








Table A.4. Percentage of patients sent to hospital, by type of consultation.  
 Emergency centre Regular GP (fee-for-
service) 
Regular GP (fixed 
salary) 
 All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
All visits  % sent to 
hospital 
Chest pain 85,093 42.6 135,941 9.4 7,181 16.8 
Abdominal pain/cramps  163,396 40.1 460,773 6.1 23,114 9.1 
Injury musculoskeletal 72,097 45.7 188,101 9.9 10,840 16.9 
Cough 63,020 2.2 368,441 0.7 18,991 0.9 
Upper respiratory infection 170,970 1.8 632,020 0.6 28,116 0.7 
Sinusitis acute/chronic 89,534 1.2 373,425 0.6 15,698 0.6 
Tonsillitis acute 49,639 6.2 82,353 2.3 3,808 3.5 
Acute 
bronchitis/bronchiolitis 
66,856 2.4 356,515 0.8 11,782 1.1 
Laceration/cut  160,273 7.2 83,762 4.8 8,182 5.3 
Cystitis/urinary infection, 
other  
200,590 3.3 356,515 1.4 21,616 1.5 




Table A.5. Effect of competition on GP sick listing, by diagnoses. GP, patient and time fixed effect 
models. 
Diagnoses: A11 D01 L81 R05 R74 




















Observations 33,180 160,277 63,826 107,358 262,096 
Dropped singleton 
observations 
42,398 97,420 43,649 120,927 217,009 
Patients 12,100 53,042 18,504 41,142 94,880 
GPs 2,738 3,713 2,981 3,481 3,731 
Prob>F 0.356 0.956 0.090 0.604 0.868 
R2 adjusted 0.407 0.377 0.350 0.324 0.320 
R2 within 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 
      
Diagnoses: R75 R76 R78 S18 U71 




















Observations 153,869 23,929 110,440 21,204 139,343 
Dropped singleton 
observations 
113,886 42,427 96,282 47,257 96,573 
Patients 52,239 9,759 40,012 7,819 47,766 
GPs 3,693 2,113 3,218 2,401 3,832 
Prob> F 0.832 0.145 0.163 0.759 0.488 
R2 adjusted 0.304 0.204 0.304 0.262 0.212 
R2 within 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.007 





















Table A.6. Descriptive statistics per consultation type, GPs with new practices.  
 Regular GP  
(fee-for-service) 




Sickness certificate 0.351 0.268 0.131 
Prolonged consultation 0.259 0.212 0.218 
Patient characteristics    
Male 0.371 0.316 0.378 
Age 39.722 (12.770) 34.277 (12.487) 37.611 (12.340) 
Visits last year 2,541 (2.375) 2.307 (2.279) 2.155 (2.325) 
Low education 0.223 0.182 0.221 
Medium education 0.416 0.377 0.437 
High education 0.361 0.441 0.343 
Labour income 38.620 (23.821) 30.426 (19.943) 38.297 (24.672) 
Married 0.417 0.320 0.403 
Unmarried 0.441 0.592 0.472 
Divorced 0.142 0.089 0.124 
Children 0-5 0.213 0.181 0.251 
Children 6-17 0.188 0.126 0.207 
GP characteristics    
Male 0.582 0.476 0.738 
Age 37.854 (7.060) 37.325 (6.511) 36.712 (6.586) 
Closed patient list 0.229 0.134 0.121 
Specialist 0.168 0.194 0.120 
Observations 112,494 3,602 33,163 
Patients 77,598 2,846 32,157 



















Figure 1a. Frequency of each diagnosis in each consultation category. 
 
Figure 1b. Sickness certification rates for each diagnosis in each consultation category. 
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